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IN THE SUPREI!E COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARLOW VINCENT and 
Mi\xtW~ VE:CENT, his vJife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Case No. 15311 
VS. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
------------------------------------------
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for the undermining of the plaintiffs' 
garage and settling caused by a Salt Lake County storm drain. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A jury trial resulted in a judgment for the plaintiffs 
in the amount of $15,645.00 which was later amended by the court 
to the amount of $17,583.47. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs seek affirmation of the judgment and 
the judgment in its favor. 
STATE~ffiNT OF FACTS 
Harlmv Vincent purchased in 1957 Lot 38, Olympus Heights 
Subdivision. This lot is kno\vn as 4222 Coral Street in Salt Lake 
County, (about 4200 South and 2600 East in Holladay, Utah) (R 68). 
He commenced construction of a home for his wife and six children 
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in the fall and winter of 1959 and 1960. (R 69) The home faces 
east and the garage is on the south side of the lot. The creation 
of the subdivision of East Olympus Hei~hts, approved by Salt lake 
County, did not create or reserve an easement for a storm drain. 
(Ex. l, R 6) In 1958 with tDe creation of the streets in Olympus 
Cove, which is a large subdivision to the east of the plaintiffs' 
property, and the surface water created from the street and the 
inability of existing channels to contain the water, (R 40) Salt 
Lake County installed a storm drain from Olympus Cove west through 
the property later purchased by the plaintiffs and installed a 
pipe of about 24 to 30 inches in diameter without any right or 
easement of record that can be found. On some of the land out-
side of the subdivision, they did get easeoents (Ex. 5). The 
storm drain pipe is relatively dry and without water most of the 
time and is Deriodic in nature and usually only contains water when 
there is a rain storm or inclement weather in Olympus Cove and the 
Holladay area. 
Harlow Vincent, on the purchase of his lot, knew that 
there was a storm drain by virtue of a collection grate on the soo~ 
side of his lot. (R 69). He thought it was along the property 
line bet\veen himself and his neighbor to the south. The storm 
I 
I 
drain line was not discovered or uncovered at any time during the , 
course of the construction of his home. (R 61) His garage is 
10 feet from the property line. 
I 
I 
L 
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In the first ten years no problem occurred, but after 
installin~ some cabinets in the garage in the fall of 1970, (R 71) 
and in the snrin~ of 1971 he noticed some ~airline cracks like putty 
dryin~ out around the windows and doors in the garage and wondered 
if the weigbt of the cabinets had caused it. (R 71) 
1972 
In the sprinp, of 1972, there was more cracking, but 
not serious, maybe an eighth of an inch over the doon.;rays in the 
garage. (R 85) He then wondered if the storm drain might be 
clor,ged so he called Salt Lake County Flood Control and asked them 
to inspect it. They didn't call him or return his call, so he 
then called them again and they said "they had made an inspection 
and they had found no coincidence between that and the storm drain". 
(R 72) 
1973 
In the spring of 1973, the cracks were greater to the 
extent of one fourth to three eighths of an inch. He called Salt 
Lake County Flood Control again and again they did not call back, 
but upon Hr. Vincent calling the!!!, they assured him "they could 
see no correlation between l!ly problem and the storm drain". 
(R 73) 
1974 
In the last of May, 1974, he noticed additional slippage 
and talked to Ken Watson (R 73), Engineering Coordinator for Salt 
-3-
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Lake County Flood Control (R 22) and they again gave him "no 
satisfaction". (R 73) Up until June, 1974, there had only 
been cracks around the doors and windows of the garage and Lynn 
Jones, Contractor, thought that it was an inadequate footing that 
was causing the problem, when he saw it in the fall of 1973, and 
said that it could have been repaired for less than $500.00 at 
that time. (R 123). Then during the months of June, July and August. 
1974, the brick wall of the garage bowed, the beams began to twist, 
the roof sagged, mortar cracked out of the joints in the brick in 
the garage. He then hired Lynn Jones and excavated along the garage 
wall and observed the water coming in from the unsealed joints of 
the storm drain. (R 74) Then after discovery of the condition 
in July, 1974, he sent notice on August 30, 1974, to Salt Lake Coun:y 
(E~. 42) All of the bowing of the brick walls, the roof sagging, 
the mortar cracking in the joints and the twisting of the beams 
and all but $500.00 damage was done during the three month period 
prior to August 30, 1974. William Kaysworm, Superintendent of Salt 
Lake County Flood Control, during the period from 1961 to 1972, 
stated that Salt Lake County had been given notice of the problem 
at the Vincent home during the period of time that he was employed, 1 
and that he personally, and the Flood Control Commissioner in 1972 I 
. I 
went to the Vincent residence. (R 101) . He thereafter sent a cre1: 1 
out and grouted the joints. (R 101). Upon being asked what he toU1 
Vincent, he said "Well, we just told him that we didn't think that I 
I 
I 
-4-
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it was our problem" * 1' ,., (R 103). He then said that the storm 
drain should not have been placed through the lot of the Vincent 
home (R 102) and that it had been poorly engineered. That from 
the time he had been employed by Salt Lake County from 1961 to 
1972, he never installed pipe without sealing the joints. (R 99) 
(R 107). He also stated that grouting joints with concrete is 
not satisfactory and they will not as a rule hold. (R 99) That 
for years Salt Lake County has required rubber gaskets for installation 
of concrete storm pipes. (Ex. 2) Blaine W. Dalton, Pipe Contrac-
tor, with vast experience in the area since the 1920s stated 
that the standards for concrete pipe installation for 40 years 
have been the same, to install water-tight joints. (R 145) He 
further testified the pipe installed down the side of the Vincent 
horne was poorly laid, not in line, (R 141) not sealed, and was 
leaking water, (R 1l12) even water was flowing under the pipe, 
(R 142) and that the pipe was filling with sand and dirt from the 
outside of the pipe. (R 144) Mr. Dalton said that the line would 
either have to be removed and replaced with proper rubber gasket 
pipe or would always continue to leak. He then explained how the 
problem had occurred in the Vincent horne, in that the water over 
a long period of time, infiltrates in and out of the pipe carrying 
the soil outside of the pipe back in to the pipe as the water 
flow goes up and dm-m within the line like a syphon. (R 146) 
In September, 1974, Basil McGlochlin, Director of 
-5-
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Highways and Flood Control of Salt Lake County (Rll3), requested 
David Lovell, Engineer, to make a determination of the problem 
at the Vincent home. On September 10, 1974, his letter is as 
follows: 
"Dear Mr. McGlochlin: 
In response to your request concerning the foundation 
settlement of the residence owned by Mr. Harlow 
Vincent at 4220 Coral Street, we have made an on 
site investigation and it is our opinion that the 
settlement is a direct result of the leaking storm 
drain adjacent to the footings. 
If we can provide additional assistance on the pro-
ject, please contact us. 
Very truly yours, 
Dale R. Holt 
County Surveyor 
DRH/DRL/js" 
A copy of the letter is attached to this Brief. The initials 
DRH/DRL in signing the letter stand for David R. Lovell. 
Don Glaittli stated that the same problem had occurred 
on his property one block to the west (R 54). Salt Lake County, 
at the time of the trial, denied that it was their storm drain 
until after the testimony of Rowland Smart, (R 39 ), Verion Smart 
(R 58 ) , Boyd C. Bott, (R 20 ) , and Don E. Glaittli (R 31 ) . 
They then stipulated that Salt Lake County had installed the 
said storm drain (R 61). 
Lynn Jones stated that prior to the time of the bowing 
of the w·alls, that the home could have been repaired and that the 
I 
-6- l 
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I 
l 
building would not have incurred additional damage if the water 
matter had been taken care of prior to the twisting of the beams, 
and the sagging of the roof which occurred in the months of June, 
July and August. The jury then found that it would take $15,093.17 
to correct the problems created by the leaking storm drain. 
POINT I 
ARGUMENT 
THE CLAIH IS NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§63-30-13, (1967). ' 
Utah Code Annotated §63-30-13 provides: 
A claim against a political subdivision shall 
be forever barred unless notice thereof is 
filed within ninety days after the cause of 
action arises; 
The question of whether this action is barred by Utah 
Code Annotated, §63-30-13, (1967), was ruled on by four judges of 
the District Court on successive motions for summary judgment 
and during the course of trial: Judge James Sawaya ruled on it, 
(R 139); Judge Dean Conder ruled on it, (R 206); Judge Bryant 
H. Croft again had the problem during the settlement conference 
and Judge G. Hal Taylor had it during the course of the trial, 
(R 375). It ~vas their opinion that since Salt Lake County had 
installed the storm drain, and that it was buried four or five feet 
in the ground, and there was no showing where Salt Lake County 
had an easement for its location so that it might be determined 
where it was, no question that it had not been discovered by the 
-7-
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plaintiff during the course of any construction during the 
building of his home, that the cause of action did not arise 
un~il discovery by the plaintiff. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Christiansen 
v. Rees, 436 P.2d 435, stated as follows: 
''(1) Therefore, we now hold that, regardless 
of prior pronouncements, where a foreign object 
is negligently left in the body of a patient 
during an operation and the patient is ignorant 
of the fact, and consequently of his right of 
action for malpractice, the cause of action does 
not accrue until the patient learned of the 
presence of such foreign object in his body . 
It seems somewhat incongruous that an injured 
person must cormnence a malpractice action prior 
to the time he knew, or reasonably should have 
known, of his injury and right of action. It 
seems apparent that adherence to the 'majority 
rule' would penalize the conscientious doctor, 
who would advise his patient of a mistake, and 
protect a practitioner, who would not reveal 
his mistake until the statute of limitations 
became a shield." 
Under the facts of this case, William Kaysworm, Flood Superintendent 
for Salt Lake County from the period of 1961 to 1972, stated that 
the rules and regulations required that all concrete storm drains 
have sealed joints. He further stated that the pipe in question 
was not sealed and was defective and he kne\v that the grout that 
he used at that time would not hold even though he sent men out 
on a fruitless mission to correct the problem. (R 101) 
If the discovery rule in this case is not applied and t:, 1 
I 
rationale of the Christiansen v. Rees case is not followed, would~l 
not be true that there would be one standard of care for doctors ~1 
-8-
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I 
:1 
professional people and still another standard of care for public 
servants and their actions. This would mean that municipal bodies 
and public servants would incur no liabilities for their actions 
bec.ause the statute of limitations would commence to run regard-
less of their mistakes, representations. They could mislead home 
owners, such as Mr. Vincent, with impunity. Again, would not 
the rationale of the Christiansen v. Rees case, supra, in fact 
penalize the conscientious public servant who would advised the 
home owner of a mistake or problem on the installation of a 
storm sewer that perhaps could be leaking water under his 
foundation and shield those public servants who would not reveal 
their negligence until after the statute of limitations had be-
come a shield. 
As the case of Rosane v. Senger, 149 P.2d 372, Colo.l944, 
and the Supreme Court of Colorado so aptly stated: 
-9-
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POINT II 
THE ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§63-30-13, (1967) ON THE GROUNDS OF CONCEAU!ENT OF THE CAUSE 
OF ACTION AND FRAUD BY THE DEFENDANT. 
In this case, Mr. Vincent noticed hairline cracks 
in 1972, and was assured by the public servants of Salt Lake 
County including the Flood Control Director for Salt Lake County, 
that it was not their problem and that it was no coincidence 
or correlation between the storm drain and his problem. (R 72) 
(R 73) (R 101) Hilliam Kaysworm also said that the installation 
was improper and that it would not hold and there was no dispute 
as to these facts and he freely admitted them. (R 99, 107, 103) 
51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, §147, states 
as the applicable law on the subject as follows: 
"The general rule supported by the decisions in 
most jurisdictions is that the fraudulent conceal-
ment of a cause of action from the one to whom it 
belongs, by the one against whom it lies, consti-
tutes an implied exception to the statute of 
limitations, postponing the commencement of the 
running of the statute until discovery or reason-
able opportunity of discovery of the fact by the 
owner of the cause of action; under this rule, one 
who '"rongfully conceals material facts and thereby 
prevents discovery of his wrong or the fact that a 
cause of action was accrued against him is not 
permitted to assert the state of limitations as a 
bar to an action against him, thus taking advantage 
of his own wrong, until the expiration of the full 
statutory period from the time when the facts were 
discovered or should with reasonable diligence have' 
been discovered . . " 
"The reasoning adopted in support of the general 
rule is that to hold that the statute of limitations 
-10-
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ran in favor of a person who had concealed the 
cause of action under such circumstances would be 
to pennit the defendant to take advantage of his 
own wrong and to sustain a defense of which in good 
conscience he ought not to be permitted to avail 
himself. Since the delay of bringing the suit is 
due to the fraud of the defendant, the cause of 
action against him ought not to be considered as 
having accrued until the plaintiff could obtain 
the knowledge that he had a cause of action. It 
would be not onlv subervise of good morals but--
contrary to the plainest principles of justice 
to permit one practicing a fraud and then concealing 
it to plead the statute of limitations when, in fact, 
the injured party did not know of and could not with 
reasonable eiligence have discovered the fraud. 
Our supreme court by previous announcement has also stated that 
even regardless of intentional fraud or concealment in the case 
of Attorney General of Utah v. Pomeroy et al., 73 P.2d 1277, at 
page 1300 as follows: 
POINT III 
"There seems to be no doubt that if this were an 
action of fraud, the statute would not begin to 
run until the fraud was discovered or reasonably 
could have been discovered. But even ~vhen the action 
is not based on fraud, in equity where the cause of 
action is concealed from the one in whom it resides 
~y the one a ainst whom it lies, the statute will 
~tponed. In 37 C.J. 73 it is said that by the 
weight of authority the same rule applies in a case 
at law." 
THIS CLAIH IS NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
§63-30-13, (1967) ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE DEFENDANT, BY ITS CONDUCT, 
IS ESTOPPED TO CLAIH THE BENEFIT OF THE STATUTE AND ALSO WAIVED 
THE SAME. 
Without repeating the facts as set forth in Point I and 
Point II, whether there was fraud and concealment and whether the 
-11-
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discovery rule applies, there was certainly waiver and estoppel 
against Salt Lake County as a matter of law. The Supreme Court 
of Utah pronounced itself in the case of Rice v. Granite School 
District, 23 Utah 2d, 22, 455 P.2d 159, where the supreme court 
says that a government entity is held to the same standard as 
a private individual: 
"In Benner v. Industrial Ace. Comm., supra, 26 Cal.2d 
349, 159, P. 2d 24, 26, the court said: lfuere, as 
here, the delay in commencing action was induced by 
the conduct of the party sought to be charged the 
latter may not invoke such conduct to defeat recovery. 
An estoppel may arise although there was no designed 
fraud on the part of the person sought to be estopped. 
To create an equitable estoppel, it is enough if the 
party has been induced to refrain from using such 
means or taking such action as lay in his power, 
by which he might have retrieved his position and 
saved himself from loss . It is well settled 
that a person by his conduct may be estopped 
to rely upon these defenses. Where the delay in 
commencing action is induced by the conduct of the 
defendant it cannot be availed of by him as a defense 
(emphasis added) 
The court went on to say: 
"Where the delay in commencing an action is induced 
by the conduct of the defendant, or his privies, or 
an insurance adjuster acting in his behalf, it 
cannot be availed of by any of them as a defense. 
One cannot justly or equity lull an adversary into 
a false sense of security thereby subjecting his 
claim to the bar of limitations, and then be heard to 
plead that very delay as a defense to the action when 
brought. Acts or conduct which wrongfully induce 
a party to believe an amicable adjustment of his 
claim '\vill be made may create an estoppel against 
pleading the Statute of Limitations." 
Under this point, there can be no question that as a matter of lm, 
Salt Lake County, by and through its servants. mislead this 
-12-
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plaintiff in reference to his cause of action and their responsibility 
for damages. If there was a dispute that Bill Kaysworm and the 
others had not stated what he indicated to the plaintiff, then there 
might be a question of fact under this point, but there is no 
question that Bill Kaysworm told this plaintiff in reference to 
the problem that was occurring, and as to waylay him and mislead 
him \vhen he ·was attempting to find out what the problem was. 
POINT IV 
THIS ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
§63-30-13, (1967), 
Utah Code Annotated, §63-30-13, (1967) provides: 
A claim against a political subdivision shall 
be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed 
within ninety days after the cause of action arises; 
Even admitting that the statute of limitations applies, 
even admitting that there was no fraud or concealment, even 
admitting that there was no estoppel or waiver, the plaintiff 
still could recover those damages which occurred within the 90 
day period from the time that he filed his claim on August 30, 1974. 
(Ex. 42) 
From the testimony of Mr. Vincent, there was only 
cracking around the doors and windows prior to June, 1974, and 
that the bmving of the vJalls, the roof sagging, the mortar cracking 
in the joints and the twisting of the beams all occurred after 
June, 1974. The plaintiff certainly could not have commenced 
-13-
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an action for those damages prior to that period of time because 
they had not occurred. Lynn Jones testified that those damages 
as he saw them were only $500.00. (R 123) He further testified 
in his opinion that if the condition had been corrected, then 
nothing further would have occurred. 
The case cited by the defendant, Power Farms, Inc. v. 
Consolidated Irr. Dist., 119 P.2d 717 (Cal. 1941), has really 
no application in that that case all of the damages were incurred 
at the one time. This case is more nearly applicable as to the 
statute of limitations problems in reference to nuisances. Blaine 
Dalton and all of the experts agree that the conditions of the 
water is such that it runs down the storm drain only at certain 
times of the year when there is rain or inclement weather in the 
Holladay area. All of the authorities agree that the pipe can 
be corrected by constantly grouting the pipe or installing new 
pipe with rubber gaskets. Therefore, the condition or the nuisanci 
as to the leaking pipe is temporary and is not permanent. The 
authorities all hold that a leaking pipe such as we have in this 
case, is a nuisance. This is thoroughly discussed in 58 Am. Jur . 
.. o 
2d, Nuisanc~ §132: 
.. .. 
"As has been seen, a right of action for damages from 
a nuisance does not arise until some injury has been 
sustained, and it is generally agreed that the sta-
tute of limitations runs from the happening of the 
injury, the first right of action arises when the 1 
first injury is inflicted. Thus, where a structure,_ 
1 
although permanent in its character, is not necessanl'i 
-14-
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and of itself a permanent and continuing nuisance, 
the statute beg~ns to run against the cause of action 
therefor only from the time of its accrual that is 
from the time when the actual damage is oc~asioned.' 
The nature of a nuisance as permanent or temporary, 
~hie~ a~ has been seen is a question that frequently 
1s d~ff~cult to determine, has an important bearing 
on the running of the statute of limitations. Where 
a nuisance is permanent in character, and its construc-
tion and continuance necessarily result in an injury, 
all damages are recoverable in only one action, and 
the statute commences to run from the completion of 
the structure or thing which constitutes or causes 
the nuisance. The fact that the nuisance continues 
does not make the cause of action a recurring one. 
The running of the statute is not prevented by the fact 
that the plaintiff failed to discover the permanent 
character of the injury, or its cause, in time to bring 
an action for damages. 
On the other hand, when the injury is not complete, 
so that the damages can be measured in one action at 
the time of the creation of the nuisance, but 
depends upon its continuance and the uncertain opera-
tion of the seasons or of the forces set in motion 
by it, the statute will not begin to run until actual 
damage has resulted therefrom. Each repetition of 
a temporary or continuing nuisance gives rise to a 
new cause of action, and recovery may be had for 
damages accruing 1vithin the statutory period next 
precedino the commencement of the action although 
more tha~ the statutory period has elapsed since 
the creation of the nuisance. Horeover, it has been 
held that the statute of limitations cannot be a 
complete bar in any case where the nuisance is of a 
continuing character and the resulting encroachment 
has progressively increased up to the time of commencing 
the action. . . " 
The leading case which cites most of the authorities 
holding that inadequate or leaky water storm drains are a nuisance 
and applying the basic la'lv as applicable as to the temporary and 
permanent nuisance law, is the case of the City of Tucson v. Apache 
-15-
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Motors, 245 P.2d 255, where the Supreme Court of Arizona stated 
that \vhere the City of Tucson constructed a water conduit Hhich 
was not adequate in 1925 and in February 1931, and that there 
were successive floods and damages in 1940 and 1943, that the 
law was as follows: 
" * * 7< if a nuisance is of such a nature 
that although the thing itself may continue, 
yet its injury to another may be abated by 
human agency, and the owner or perpetrator of 
the nuisance fails to abate it, the nuisance is a 
continuing one, and one action does not exhaust 
the remedies of the parties injured. If, how-
ever, the thing is of such a character that it 
cannot be maintained Hithout continuing to be, 
in the legal sense, a nuisance, it is permanent 
in its nature, and the rights of the injured 
party are exhausted by one action." 
"(1-3) He believe the general rule to be that 
if a nuisance falls Hithin the definition of a 
permanent nuisance ordinarily the cause of action 
arises immediately upon the creation of the 
nuisance and all damages past, present and future 
must be recovered in one cause of action and that the 
measure of damages to the realty is the difference 
between the market value of the premises immediately 
before and its market value immediately after the 
completion of the structure creating the nuisance. 
This is not always the rule, hoHever, as will be 
hereinafter sho\VTI. On the other hand if the nuisance 
is temporary or continuing, a cause of action arises 
upon the occurrence of each successive injury sus-
tained. Huch confusion has arisen in the various 
jurisdictions of the United States as to just what 
constitututes a permanent nuisance as distinguished 
from a temporary or continuing nuisance so as to 
entitle the injured person to recover all damages 
sustained in one cause of action and Hhat elements 
must concur to start the statute of limitations to 
running against the injured party. Perhaps it might 
be more accurate to say that the confusion arises 
more from an application of the facts in each case 
to the rule of law defining a permanent nuisance." 
-16-
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The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case of Ludlow et al. 
v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 137 P. 2d 347, again stated 
that in these type of actions that the trial court was not in 
error in holding that the statute of limitations was not appli-
cable when they said: 
"Furthermore, the trial court properly held that 
the nuisance was a recurring rather than a con-
tinuing one, and therefore very properly held that 
the statutes of limitations were inapplicable. 
Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 
231 P. 813." 
In this case what action for damages could have been brought in 
1972 with two hairline cracks above the doorways if nothing more 
had occurred? What action could have been brought in 1973 which 
required nothing more than caulking and as early as May, 1974, 
not more than $500.00 would have taken care of the problem. We 
certainly agree with the Supreme Court of Arizona and the prior 
announcements of the Utah Supreme Court that the nature of this 
action is a recurring one and that a cause of action arises each 
time that injury occurs. Therefore, even admitting all of the 
allegations prior to this time of the defendant, at the most it 
would only be $500.00. 
-17-
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POINT V 
THE LEAKING STOR11 SEWER HAS NOT A "LATEi':tT DEFECT". 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act waives governmental 
immunity for defects in public improvements in Utah Code Annotated, 
§63-30-9. That section also provides, however: 
Immunity is not waived for latent defective 
conditions. 
Blacks Law Dictionary, Third Edition, defines latent defect as 
follows: 
"A defect in an article sold, which is known 
to the seller, but not to the purchaser, and is 
not discoverable bv mere observation. See Hoe v. 
Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 5S2, 78 Am. Dec. 163. A defect 
which reasonably careful inspection will not reveal. 
Schaff v. Ellison (Tex. Clv. App.) 255 S.W. 680, 682." 
The question of latent defects and the interpretation of latent 
defects has been handled in many car and truck accidents and 
been interpretated in many insurance cases. All of the cases 
indicate that a latent defect is one that could not be discovered 
by reasonable means, and that if discovered it is no longer latent. 
In the case of Arrow Transportation Company v. A. 0. Smith Company, 
a corporation, 454 P.2d 387, was an action by a trucking company 
against a manufacturer of the fifth wheel for indennity for 
damages when the mechanism failed. The evidence also indicated 
that the trucking company had been fore~varned by an engineering 
firm that the loads which the trucking company intended to 
subject the fifth wheel had caused fatigue factor. The Supreme 
Court of "t-Yashington said: 
' I 
-18-
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"(~) Hithout question, the Smithway fifth-wheel 
fa~lure was caused by a 'fatigue fracture' of the 
vertical metal inner tube. However, this standing 
alone, does not establish a defect in manufacture 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the 
Smithway fifth-wheel departed, in any YTay, from the 
original design which caused the Engineers to inform 
Arrow of the inadequate safety factor in the Smith-
w~y to withstand their service loads. At best, the 
f~fth-wheel was inadequately designed for Arrow's 
use, but the inadequacy was one about which Arrow had 
been fully informed. Furthermore, a 'fatigue failure' 
about which one is fully warned can hardly be classed 
as a latent defect. A latent defect is one which 
could not have been discovered bv inspection. 
Hyde v. Bryant, 114 Ga. App. 535·, 151 S.E.2d 925 (1966)." 
(emphasis added) 
-In the case of John W. Simmons Trucking Company, Inc. 
and John H. Simmons, v. Lester Briscoe, Okl., 373 P.2d 49, an 
Oklahoma case was where an automobile was struck in the rear by 
a truck whose brakes failed and the defense of the trucking company 
was that the failure was due to a latent defect. The Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma rapidly disposed of that argument by saying: 
"There was nothing to show that a good mechanic 
could not have discovered any of the defects 
in the defendants' braking system on the truck." 
In the case of Southwest Welding & Manufacturing Company v. The 
United States, 413 F.2d 1167 (1969), this was a case where the 
contractor was entitled to an equitable adjustment in the contract 
price for extra work in removing defects and the claim of the 
United States Government was that they were not because they were 
latent defects. The circuit court of appeals then stated: 
"The stipulated facts above summ~rized illustrate 
conclusively that there was noth~ng latent about 
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these indications. They were readily discoverable 
upon any reasonable inspection prescribed by this 
contract_or readily available. Moreover, they were 
at ~11 t~mes.actua~ly known to both parties, and the 
subject of d~scuss~on throughout the period that 
these sections were being inspected, passed painted 
and installed in the concrete tunnels." ' 
The case of Plaza Equities Corp v. Aetna Casualty 
and Surety Company, 372 F. Supp. 1325 (1974) was an insurance 
case where Aetna set forth a policy defense in its insurance 
contract that the damage was caused by a latent defect. The court 
then went on to say: 
"A latent defect within the meaning of this policy 
exclusion is an imperfection in the materials used 
which could not ~e discovered by any known and cus-
tomary test. . .. The Court has found that here 
the loss was caused by the misjudgment of the 
plaintiffs in not installing adequate supporting 
structures to carry the weight of the phoenix, not by 
any defect in the materials used nor in their installa-
tion. In any event, Employers' has not presented any 
evidence that this misjudgment could not have been 
discovered through the use of normal weight distribu-
tion and stress calculations. Therefore, the court 
finds that this exclusion does not apply in the 
present case." 
In this case there was nothing latent about a leaky 
concrete pipe that was causing damage to plaintiffs' home. The 
defendant is not complaining, for example, that the cement in 
the pipe was inferior, etc. and that as a result it failed, which 
would be a classic example of a latent defective, but the facrs 
in this case are just plainly that Salt Lake County negligently 
installed the original pipe, negligently failed to grout it, and 
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failed to correct it when it was brought to their attention. 
There cannot be a latent defect if the problem can be discovered 
by an ordinary inspection which, of course, any installer of 
pipe or expert would automatically know and it is submitted that 
the word "latent" means unknown and it cannot be unknown after 
it has been brought to their attention. 
The rationale of the John W. Simmons Trucking v. 
Lester Briscoe, supra, Oklahona case, where that court disposed 
of the latent defect argument by saying: 
"There is nothing to show that a good mechanic 
could not have discovered any of the defects 
in the defendants braking system on the truck." 
There is nothing to show that any good pipe mechanic in this case 
would not have discovered the defect. This type of situation 
was never intended to be covered by the legislature as an exclu-
sion by Salt Lake County. As the Aetna Casualty and Surety case, 
supra, states: 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT VI 
"A latent defect within the meaning of this policy 
exclusion is an imperfection in the materials used 
which could not be discovered by any known and 
customary test." 
THE COURT DID NOT ERROR ON THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE 
THEORY OF NUISANCE. 
The trial court submitted the case on two theories 
to the jury as follows: 
-21-
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FIRST: The case of whether the defendant was negligent 
and whether the negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs, 
injuries. (R 354) Under the theory of negligence and an examina-
tion of instructions 10, (R 354) and instruction 11, (R355) it is 
very apparent that the instructions are proper as to negligence 
and were properly submitted to the jury. 
SECOND: The second theory was whether the defendant 
had created the nuisance and that the nuisance was the cause of 
the plaintiffs' damage. 
The court in Instruction 13 (R 357) defined a 
nuisance as follows: 
"You are instructed that a nuisance is anything 
whic~ is injurious to health, or indecent, or 
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the 
free use of property, so as to interfere with the 
comfortable enjoyment of life or property." 
An examination of 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Nuisances, §1 under definitions 
and the authority cited, the court very closely followed the 
general law of Am. Jur., supra, which states a nuisance as 
follows: 
"A nuisance has variously been defined to be that 
which unlawfully annoys or does damage to another, 
anything that works an injury, harm, or prejudice to 
an individual or the public, anything that works hurt, 
inconvenience, or damage, anything which annoys or 
disturbs one in the free use, possession, or enjoy-
ment of his property or which renders its ordinary use 
or physical occupation uncomfortable, and anything 
wrongfully done or permitted which injures or annoys 
another in the enjoyment of his le~al rights. There 
are numerous other similar definitions in the text-
books and reports, and there are statutory definitions 
in some states." 
-22-
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The court then went on to say in Instruction No. 9 (R 353): 
"Th e party.up?n whom the burden of proof rests 
must susta1n 1t by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The law does not permit you to base a verdict on 
speculation or conjecture as to the cause of the 
incident in question. If the evidence does not 
prepond~rate in fav?r of the party making the charge 
of negl1gence or nu1sance, then he has failed to 
fulfill his.burden of proof and your finding 
must be aga1nst that party on that issue. In other 
words, if after considering all of the evidence 
it should appear to you just as probable that the 
defendant ~vas not negligent as that he was or that 
his negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause of the 
incident as that it was such a proximate cause or if 
after consideration of all of the evidence it should 
appear to you just as probable that the defendant 
did not create or maintain a nuisance as that it did 
or that the nuisance, if any, was not a proximate 
cause of the incident as that it was such a proximate 
cause, then a case has not been established against him 
by a preponderance of the evidence as the law requires 
and he cannot be held liable." 
The court then went on pursuant to Instruction No. 14, (R 358) 
as follows: 
"A nuisance is a condition, not an act or failure to 
act on the part of the person responsible for the 
condition. If the wrongful condition exists, and the 
person charges therewith is responsible for its exis-
tence, he is liable for the resulting damages to others 
although he may have used the highest possible degree 
of care to prevent or minimize the deleterious effects. 
Recovery in an action for a nuisance cannot be de-
feated by showing that there was no negligence on the 
part of the defendant. 
"A Nuisance does not rest on the degree of care used, 
for that presents a question of negligence, but on the 
degree of danger existing even with t~e best.of care, 
the question of care or want of ~are.1s not :nvolve~. 
Thus, a person who creates or ma1nta1ns a nu:sance 1s 
liable for the resulting injury to others, w1thout 
regard to the degree of care or skill.exercised by him 
to avoid the injury, and notwithstand1ng tha~ he 
exercises reasonable or ordinary care and sk1ll, or 
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even the highest possible degree of care. 
"A nuisance may or may not be based in the negligent 
act of the one creating it. However, it frequently 
is the consequence of negligence, or the same acts 
or omissions which constitute negligence which may 
give rise to a nuisance. A lawful action may 
become a nuisance by reason of its negligence perfor-
mance." 
Therefore, in order to hold the defendant liable under the theory 
of negligence, first of all the jury had to find that a nuisance 
had been created by the preponderance of the evidence, and that 
the elements that were in the definition had not been complied with 
and that the maintenance of that nuisance might or might not be 
a result of negligence, but that the condition was a proximate 
cause of damage to the plaintiffs' property. 58 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Nuisances, §3, provides as follows: 
"'Negligence' and 'nuisance' are not synonymous terms. 
They are distinct torts, and are different in their 
nature and consequences. As subsequently is observed, 
negligence is not a necessary ingredient of a nuisance. 
To render a person liable on the theory of either 
nuisance or negligence there must be some breach of 
duty on his part, but liability for negligence is 
based on a want of proper care, while ordinarily, a 
person who creates or maintains a nuisance is liable 
for the resulting injury to others regardless of the 
degree of care or skill exercised to avoid the injury. 
The creation or maintenance of a nuisance is a viola-
tion of an absolute duty, the doing of an act which 
is wrongful in itself, whereas negligence is a violatioo 
of a relative duty, the failure to use the degree of 
care required under particular circumstances in con-
nection \vith an act or omission which is not of itself 
wrongful. Nuisance is a condition and not an act or 
failure to act, so that if a wrongful condition exists, 
the person responsible for its existence is liable 
for resulting damage to others. It has been held that 
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where the damage is the necessary consequence of 
what the defendant is doing, or is incident to the 
business itself or the manner in which it is conducted, 
the law of negligence has no application, and the law 
of nuisance applies. However, these torts may be, 
and frequently are, coexisting and practically 
inseparable, as where acts or omissions constituting 
negligence also give rise to a nuisance, and it is 
difficult at times to distinguish between actions of 
nuisance and those bottomed on negligence .... " 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota in the case of 
Kinnischtzke v. Glenn Ullin, 79 liD 495, 57 NW2d 588, said: 
"Negligence may or may not result in the creation 
of a nuisance, and, on the other hand, a nuisance 
may be created wholly without negligence." 
In this case, the defendant, since 1972, when it attempted to 
repair the leaking pipeline knew of its condition and allowed 
that condition to exist from that time even to the present. It 
is submitted that a leaky storm sewer which seeps water and under-
mines the foundation of the plaintiffs' home continually is a 
nuisance and a wrongful act within itself; and to continue to 
maintain that wrongful act makes Salt Lake County liable for the 
damages and consequences of the condition which it allowed to 
exist. This would be the same as a chemical plant knowing that 
it was emitting acid from its smoke stacks onto the cars of the 
general public and then not be responsible for its actions. The 
restatement of torts as cited by the defendant seems to indicate 
that it turns on whether it is intentional or unreasonable. How 
can it be said that under that definition that a matter of law 
in this case Salt Lake County's conduct was not that of being 
intentional and unreasonable. 
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CONCLUSION 
Don Glaittli, (R 54) stated that within three years 
after the installation of the storm drain in 1958 that the same 
problem was being created a block to the west on his property and 
Salt Lake County was there correcting the same problem relative 
to the failure to seal the joints. Then with all of that knowledge 
in 1972 and thereafter, Salt Lake County continued to make rep-
resentations, mislead and waylay the plaintiffs who were attempting 
only to find what was causing the problem that was undermining 
their garage foundation. Now Salt Lake County seeks to plead 
and claim the benefit of a Statute of Limitations and apply the s~e 
regardless of their actions, conduct or responsibility. It is 
submitted that to fail to uphold the verdict of the jury, and 
the judgment of the District Court and the trial judge who reviewed 
the entire matter, would be to apply a non-responsible standard 
to public servants and uphold their conduct, and apply a Statute 
of Limitations if the period of time runs out before a person can 
file an action and discover the implications of their actions. 
It is also submitted that Salt Lake County, by its 
actions, has been guilty of fraud, concealment and also should be 
estopped to claim the Statute of Limitations under the doctrine of 
Rice v. Granite School District, supra. It is also apparent that 
they have maintained a nuisance in allowing water to infiltrate fro: 
their concrete storm drain to flow under the foundation of the 
plaintiffs' garage and undermine the same. It is also submitted 
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that the nature of the action is temporary and a continuing nuisance 
which can be abated by proper construction which should have been 
installed in the first instance or corrected at a later date or 
even now. The general law as set forth in the arguments that since 
the nuisance is one of a temporary and continuing nature, that each 
cause of action arose each time the damage occurred and each 
spring and summer when the flood waters came down the storm drain. 
Although it is submitted that all of the other arguments apply, 
even perchance if they should not, the most the defendants would 
be entitled to is to $500.00 reduction in reference to the total 
amount of the judgment. 
The attached letter, written by David Lovell, certainly 
sets forth the culpable responsibility of Salt Lake County and it 
is submitted that they should respond to the damages which the 
jury has found in the case. 
Respectfully submitted this ~~day of January, 1978. 
CANNON & DUFFIN 
Attorney for Plai~tiffs 
and Respondents 
Ten Broadway Building, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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.:I 
'- \ 
OFFICE OF SURVEYOR 
September 10, 1974 
Mr. Basil McGlochlin, Dtrector 
Departwent of High\-i3Y and Flood Control 
Hidvale, Utah 
Dear Mr. McGlochlin: 
PLAIUTI<F'S 
. EXI-!IiliT 
3 
~.1AI1\J Ocr ICE 
8ld0 l·!o. 1, Roo•:o .'JJQ 
2033 SclUtn StJi~ S:r-:t:: 
FIELD QCF!CE 
Blda. 3, 2033 S~ulh S<e:o s1,,: 
In response to your request concerning the foundation settlement of the 
residence o·:med by tk. Harlo•-1 Vincent at 4220 Coral Street, He have 
made an on site investigation and it is our opinion that the settle"'ent 
is a direct result of the leaking storm drain adjacent to the footings. 
If we can provide additional assistance on the project, please contact us . 
Very truly yours, 
lJ "'__t ;?. 'l,{J/ ~ yi] ;c / 
DALE R. HOLT 
County Surveyor 
DRH/DRL/js 
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I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the 
foregoing brief to Scott Daniels, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
att~rneys for Defendant, 700 Continental Bank Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid, this day of 
January, 1978. 
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